Conclusion: Can China feed itself? |
Before we
can answer this question we have to rephrase it in the following more specific form: Will
China depend on food imports to satisfy the food demand of its population in 2025 (or
2050)? In other words: Will China be able to feed itself from its own resources of arable
land and water? Yes, China can feed itself!
China has enough arable land and water to feed its projected population of 1.48 billion in
2025 - even at currently available levels of agricultural technology. According
to a detailed Agro-ecological Assessment model (AEZ), which was developed by IIASA and FAO
and recently applied to China on the basis of greatly improved soil, terrain, and climate
databases, the country has enough cultivation potential to produce about 650 million tons
of grain. This production potential meets most food demand projections, such as
those from the World Bank, from the US Department of Agriculture, or from the Food Demand
Scenarios for China reported in this application. The assessment takes into account that
about 25% of the arable land will be reserved for other types of agricultural production,
such as cultivation of vegetables or fruits; it also discounts land needed for
infrastructure.
However, the reader should not misunderstand the above conclusion. It does not claim that
China will, in fact, feed itself. First, China might find it economically
more attractive to import a certain amount of (food) grain, instead of pushing
grain production to its limits. Some parts of the very limited cropland might be used for
better purposes than producing rice, wheat, or maize. Second, there is no guarantee that
China will develop its agriculture and economy in such a way that it can actually utilize
the existing agro-climatic potential. This depends on political and economic decisions,
which cannot be predicted. China will only be able to feed itself, if it undertakes
serious efforts to solve the following problems (the list below is in no particular
order): |
 |
 |
 |
China
can (and should) greatly improve water use efficiency in agriculture |
  |
The
current limitation of agriculture in China is water rather than land.
Large parts of the existing agricultural areas in the North cannot be cultivated to their
full potential due to insufficient rainfall. There are also some 30 million hectares of
land reserves; some of these could only be utilized with irrigation.
Therefore, China's central (and provincial) governments will have to focus on the water
problems. This should include projects to increase water supply in agricultural
deficit regions; projects to improve water quality and waste water treatment; and
in particular projects to improve irrigation efficiency. Various authors have
pointed out the problem of water waste in open irrigation canals and on flood-irrigated
fields. The estimated water loss is in the range of up to 60%. This is a significant water
resource for the drought-affected North China Plain, that could be developed in relatively
short time by better maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and more advanced irrigation
technology. |
 |
A
trans-basin water diversion is necessary to better supply China's high population
concentration in the North China Plain |
  |
During
the next decades not only the agricultural sector in the North will need more water for
additional irrigation, there is also a rapidly growing competitive water demand from urban
areas and industries. Improvements in water use efficiency could cover some of this
demand, but not all of it. Trans-basin water diversion from the Yangtze to the Yellow
river is probably the only option in the long run to develop an effective water supply for
the North of China. |
 |
Bottlenecks
in transportation infrastructure, technology, and logistics have to be removed |
  |
China's
insufficient transportation infrastructure, outdated transportation technology, and
under-developed logistics are serious bottlenecks in the food sector. Particularly, the
insufficient harbor capacity, the overburdened railroads, and the lack of adequate roads
in many remote areas pose serious risks in case of local or regional food shortages. As
the Chinese say: "The trip to Sichuan is more difficult than a trip to heaven". |
 |
Larger
farm sizes should be promoted by gradual privatization of the arable land |
  |
The large
number of very small farms is one of the factors, which prevent further modernization in
China's agriculture. China's family farms are usually too small to take advantage of
economies of scale. A modification of the strict land-transfer rights and the introduction
of private ownership of land would introduce a market for arable land. Small farmers, who
in the meantime already generate their main income from employment in rural industries,
could sell their property rights to larger, more productive farms. This would lead to a
consolidation of China's farm structure, which would boost productivity. |
 |
China
would benefit from a moderate increase of (feed) grain imports |
  |
Economically,
it makes no sense to increase pressure on farmers for producing ever more grain in order
to achieve a very high self-sufficiency ratio. The limited resources of good cropland in
China could be used more efficiently in the labor-intensive cultivation of high-value
crops, such as vegetables, fruit, or nuts. China might even use these areas for a highly
profitable production of export crops. In that way, China could balance moderate
imports of (feed) grain with exports of certain agricultural products. Slowly
growing grain imports of China up to a volume of 30 - 50 million tons would not disturb
the world market, because they are well within the "normal" historical
fluctuations and could be met by production increases in the USA, Europe, and Australia. |
 |
Flood
prevention measures must be intensified |
  |
Floods
are a serious threat to food security in China. Between 1988 and 1995 China has lost some
856,000 hectares of cropland due to disasters - primarily flooding. Some 33,000 medium and
smaller dams and dykes in China need urgent repairs, better maintainance, or even
reconstruction. |
 |
Research
in bio-technology should be further supported |
  |
China is
already one of the leading countries in advanced rice biotechnology research. Since the
mid-1980s, Chinese research centers have begun to develop advanced biotechnological tools,
such as recombinant DNA technology. Because of the potential (but also risks) of
genetically modified plants and animals for China's future food supply, these research
efforts should be strengthened. |
 |
Some
state intervention in the grain sector is necessary to guarantee a sufficient grain supply |
  |
A
sufficient and stable supply of the primary food commodities, rice and wheat, will
probably require - as in many other countries - some kind of state intervention. In the
West, this often takes the form of agricultural subsidies, price regulation or production
quotas. Under China's current grain procurement system the state acquires grain from the
farmers at fixed and at negotiated prices - only a small percentage can be sold at market
price. More attractive producer prices would certainly stimulate grain production to a
greater extent than any kind of pressure. |
 |
Family
planning can prevent a larger than expected growth in food demand |
  |
Without
continuation of an effective family planning program China's food demand would probably
grow more rapidly than expected. While lifestyle change associated with increasing
prosperity has led to very low voluntary fertility rates in urban areas, the situation is
certainly different in the countryside. In rural areas people might increase the
number of children, if family planning restrictions were relaxed. However, only a slight
increase in average fertility would increase China's population - and mouths to feed - by
hundreds of millions. |
 |
China's
agriculture might benefit from climate change |
  |
The
literature on climate change in China is inconsistent. While some authors see slight to
moderate disadvantages for China's agriculture, others see benefits. According to
preliminary assessments with the IIASA AEZ model the most likely impact of climate change
would be a slight improvement in the North of China - which would benefit from
higher temperatures and increasing precipitation.The cultivated land in southern China, on
the other hand, would only be affected slightly by increased tropical storms. China's
South is too far "north" for the climate change impact of increased storms that
is typical for the hot tropics. |
China's farmers are currently
cultivating some 132 million hectares - an area which is almost 40% larger than previously
estimated. Therefore, grain yields in the 1980s and early 1990s were inflated (due to the
overestimated denominator), which - on the other hand - means that the farmers actually
have "more room" to increase productivity. In addition there are some 30 million
hectares of land reserves - primarily in the North. Most of the reserves in arid regions
could be cultivated, if irrigation water would be available.
We believe that the most critical resource for China's agriculture is water, not land. The
regional distribution of water resources does not match the agricultural (irrigation)
demand, and many rivers and lakes are seriously polluted. Massive investments into the
water infrastructure will be needed. Soil degradation exists, but often outside cultivated
areas. Its effect on agricultural productivity can also be reduced by adequate management
and conservation measures - as indicated by the six-fold increase in grain production
since the early 1960s.
Finally, it should be emphasized that economic and policy measures are the key to China's
food security. The "Great Famine" in China, which probably killed more than 30
million people during the "Great Leap Forward" (between 1959 and 1961) was not
caused by shortage of land or water, insufficient agricultural technology, or higher than
expected food demand. It was caused by faulty policy measures. More than anything else, it
will be the decisions of policy makers that will determine whether China can feed its
population by the middle of the next century. |
  |
  |
Revision 2.0 (First revision published in 1999)
- Copyright © 2011 by Gerhard K. Heilig. All rights reserved. (First revision: Copyright © 1999 by IIASA.) |
|